


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THE NEW WORLD ORDER: Implications for Army Policy and Force Structure

BY

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United States Army

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THE NEW WORLD ORDER:

Implications for Army Policy and Force Structure

by

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In the aftermath of World War II, the United States adopted a strategy of containment of the Soviet Union. That strategy, as originally espoused by George Kennan and refined by policy makers, guided United States policy and helped to structure US forces worldwide for close to forty years. The strategy was gradually replaced during the eighties and nineties as US policy shifted increasingly to one of not merely containing but rolling back communism. Today the Cold War is over and the United States is debating its proper role in the "New World Order". This paper analyzes that new world and proposes national security policies, and a national and military strategy to best advance US interests.

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INTRODUCTION

There is a new world, but it is still in disorder. Democracy's triumph over communism ended the titanic struggle of ideologies that divided the world into two rival camps. But, our success has created instabilities in the international system. The dissolution of the Soviet Union heralds the rise of nationalism in Eurasia as long-suppressed ethnic rivalries threaten to shatter established political boundaries.

While the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Russian republic teeter on the brink of political and economic collapse, new economic power centers are coming of age in Europe and Asia. The veil of "Cold War" conflict has been removed to reveal an underlying world of tripolar economic competition. The resurrected German and Japanese economies have formed alternative power centers that will rival US hegemony in the new world.

In the future, the United States, a united Europe, and Japan will be engaged in protracted economic competition. By 1996, Europe will have a single currency and an integrated economy. Its combined GNP will exceed that of the US and so will its population. Centered on a reunified Germany, Europe's economic sphere of influence will incorporate markets and resources in all of Eurasia.

The second and fastest growing economic powerhouse is Japan. Although it has only half the GNP of the United States, there is potential for economic alliance with other pro-business Asian states and eventually with mainland China. The addition of resource-rich China provides the Asian power center near economic self-sufficiency as well as vast internal markets and cheap labor.

As the world divides into tripolar spheres of influence, the United States is likely to extend and strengthen its economic dominion over all the Americas. Traditionally good trade relations with Canada and the recently concluded free trade agreement with Mexico are a harbinger of things to come.

Whether the three poles will see each other as potential markets and customers or as adversaries depends on internal politics, international leadership, and powerful market forces. The world has grown increasingly interdependent and multinational corporations abound. Modern technology allows capital to flow to the best investment markets rapidly and with little regard for political boundaries. But, despite an increase in trade between the poles in recent years, the prospect of an Orwellian geopolitical future looms over a tripolar world economy. There is the very real threat of increased protectionism and trade wars.

Even in a future where economic competition is non-confrontational and cooperative ventures to open world markets for

the benefit of all are successful, there are near-term military dangers. Military power becomes more diffused as the two military superpowers disarm and as rocket and nuclear weapons technology becomes increasingly available to third world nations. Should trends continue unchecked, unstable regimes will gain the power to threaten their regions, and indeed the world, with weapons of mass destruction by the end of the decade.

What the future holds is still unclear. Will the world be divided into three rival camps? Will United States interests be threatened by a growing array of economically insignificant, yet militarily powerful third world countries? Are solutions to be found in reliance upon multinational organizations or unilateral action to protect our own interests? The answers depend in large measure on how the United States defines its role in shaping the "New World Order." Ultimately, it is the United States as the world's only true superpower - political, economic, and military - that has the power to shape the future world order.

The purpose of this paper is to conduct a systematic analysis of America's purpose, interests, national security policy, national and military strategies, and their implications for Army force structure. The paper is an independent analysis and the strategic appraisals and military assessments are my own. No attempt is made to conform to official political positions nor Army policy.

NATIONAL PURPOSE

The United States of America is a constitutional democracy which is based on a republican form of government. Its guiding principles are formally established in the opening lines of the Declaration of Independence and in the preamble to the Constitution. The Declaration espouses the dignity of the individual and his natural rights:

We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal and endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, amongst them life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The preamble to the Constitution establishes the goals of American government:

We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

The implications of our charter do not extend far beyond the shores of the United States in the sense that we have a messianic, or world policeman role to play. Nor does the government have authority to cede sovereignty of the people to world government or international organizations. Our government derives its legitimacy from the consent of the American people. Domestic and common

defense goals of the United States are the bedrock of the republic.

These limitations do not dictate strict neutrality nor isolationism in foreign policy. The constitution gives our government clear authority to make treaties and to conduct foreign policy. To the extent that the US promotes its own security by supporting democracy and freedom worldwide, we make the world a safer place for ourselves and our posterity. With communism defeated, the world looks to us for leadership. It would be a mistake to adopt a policy of disengagement that creates power vacuums, further destabilizes insecure regions of the world, and invites global rearmament.

The means by which we accomplish our goals must extend to cooperation with other nations in the pursuit of common interests without violating our charter or relinquishing our sovereignty. Although alliances that advance American interests are desirable, they may be transitory. We must discard coalitions when they have served their purpose. Few in the new world order shares all our basic values, democratic traditions, and national interests.

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NATIONAL INTERESTS

Precision in defining what is in America's best interests is the crucial foundation of national and military policy. The Weinberger Doctrine, quite correctly, prescribes that we first determine that survival or vital interests are at stake before we make any major commitments to the use of military force. This paper will identify the basic interests of the United States, and the likely threats to those interests in the new world.

Survival Interests:

Historically, the United States has faced a variety of threats to its survival from sources as diverse as foreign invasion to internal rebellion. An exhaustive list of past threats and remote future threats and interests obscures the real issue. Today, there is only one overriding threat to national survival. Our interest:

Protection of the United States from nuclear attack.

Vital Interests:

Our vital interests are important enough that we might use military force to secure them. The corollary established by the Weinberger Doctrine is that we ensure vital interests are at stake before we commit US troops.

America has three vital interests that relate directly to our survival interest and deal with weapons of mass destruction:

Nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and intercontinental delivery systems.

Responsible (rational actor) control over weapons of mass destruction.

Prevention of regional nuclear war.

The other broad categories of vital interests are:

Protection of US citizens and property at home and abroad. This interest is tied to ending state-sponsored terrorism as a means of foreign policy.

Access to reasonably priced energy supplies (i.e. oil) for the United States and other friendly democracies.

Protection of our allies from attack. The United States must honor its mutual defense treaty obligations. This is not only a means of achieving policy objectives, but a vital interest unto itself. It helps us conduct foreign policy in pursuit of more tangible interests.

If friends and allies can't count on us to honor basic commitments, it won't be long before we don't have allies. Without loyal allies, achieving our own goals becomes more difficult. With the threat of world communism receding, it is our treaty ties that still bind us to the countries in NATO, and to Israel and South Korea. If we no longer have vital interests in their security other than defense of treaty obligations, we should abrogate the treaties.

Today, there are still important reasons to protect **free and democratic states in NATO, Israel and Korea from external aggression** . Not the least important reasons are stability and war prevention in a time of geopolitical change. The NATO countries are a counterbalance to Soviet revanchism and along with Israel provide bases and allies should power projection into the oil regions be necessary.

The Korean connection is vital to the US because our presence and involvement mitigates against nuclear and conventional arms races in the region. In a power vacuum, the Japanese might feel the need to become a nuclear power. We don't want a rival economic power to become a superpower. We want to continue to play a dominant military and political role.

Freedom of the seas and space. This is primarily a defense of long-standing principle. It is easily accomplished because of the

dominance of our naval forces and space program and it is directly tied to the next major interest.

Major Interests:

Access to resources and markets. Other than oil, no resources or strategic minerals, can be described as vital to the United States. If one source is cut off, alternative sources or materials can be found. The rise of cartels that could restrict supply are not envisioned in the near future and are a low percentage calculation in long-term futures.

Economic well-being. A strong and prosperous America is ultimately important to our survival. State-led cartels that conspired unfairly against US economic interests could elevate this interest to vital, but only in times of economic crisis.

Promotion of values. We aspire to peace with freedom. We want it for ourselves and we want it for others. We encourage free association and nationalism. We have a practical and moral responsibility to promote freedom, democracy, and individual rights (including property rights) worldwide. We can promote our values in a variety of ways without sacrificing American lives. Official means to promote our values include the United States Information Agency, Radio Marti, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, Congress' National Endowment for Democracy, diplomatic contacts, security

assistance, and when required, political pressure and economic sanctions short of war.

Reduction or elimination of existing foreign nuclear arsenals and delivery capabilities. This interest would be elevated to vital if unstable regimes came to power in any of the nuclear or nuclear-capable countries and the US was without a deployed strategic defense system.

Whenever and wherever possible the weakening and **destruction of international terrorist groups, drug cartels, and crime syndicates** and an end to state sponsored terrorism.

In addition to generic trade interests, the United States has regional major interests in:

The Americas:

A peaceful and friendly Cuba. Collapse of the Cuban communist government and the military dictatorship in Haiti are in the United State's interest. Current trade sanctions against the two countries are in keeping with our major interest in promoting freedom and human rights. The chief difference is that Cuba, a hostile nation with advanced military weaponry, is only 90 miles from our coast and an immediate threat. Denied Soviet assistance, Cuba may seek other anti-American allies. That would raise this

interest to vital and provide an ideal opportunity to enforce the Monroe Doctrine's prohibition against foreign power military interference in the Americas. Renewed official sanction of drug trafficking through Cuban territory would be another reason to raise destabilization of the regime to a vital interest.

Europe and the former Soviet Union:

Maintenance of NATO's strong transatlantic link. This provides stability for all of Europe's democracies from the Atlantic to the Urals and reduces the need for large standing armies.

Democratic and peaceful regimes in the republics of Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan. At a minimum, our goal is the absence of a resurgent militaristic or communist state in these nuclear republics. This is a temporary interest of major import because of its relation to our chief survival interest. The long-range goal is a non-nuclear Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan.

The Middle East and Southwest Asia:

Access to forward bases on the Arabian peninsula, if not a major interest, is a key means of protecting access to oil.

Peace between Israel and the Arabs. We are likely to be drawn

into this conflict to protect an old ally or to guarantee our continued access to oil.

Africa:

Access to certain strategic minerals such as cobalt.

Asia:

A peaceful, free, and united Korea. Vital interests are also at stake given the prospect of a nuclear North Korean. If North Korea gets the bomb, can South Korea and Japan be far behind? Despite recent Japanese history, the regional arms race threatens to escalate to the nuclear level. The North Koreans are also a leading exporter of Scud missiles and act as a destabilizing force by selling arms to other outlaw nations such as Libya and Iran.

A peaceful and democratic China. China remains a threat to its peaceful Asian neighbors especially South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. China's continued support for North Korea threatens South Korea and ultimately, Japan.

The remainder of the world's marxist dictatorships are also in Asia. The only communist dictatorship in the rest of the world is Cuba. Collapse of undemocratic regimes and eventual **peace with freedom in Cambodia, Viet Nam, Burma and North Korea** would make the

region safer. Military conflicts between democratic nations haven't occurred in this century.

Peripheral Interests:

United States interests in promoting a safe, prosperous and healthy world for ourselves include **protection of the environment, controlled immigration, and a narcotics-free society**. The military is already involved in drug interdiction missions in support of the Coast Guard and these missions could easily be extended to include raids outside US borders. But, the *Posse Comitatus* Act wisely prohibits a military role in domestic law enforcement.

Ultimately, we desire a community of sovereign nations secure from the threats of external aggression and internal repression. A world in which individual liberties flourish and freedom and democracy set the stage for sustained peace and prosperity.

Non-interests:

The military need not become involved in a host of dubious public works, border patrol, and public relations projects designed to preserve "force structure". These often self-serving schemes serve no real national interest. What's worse, they threaten the readiness, training, and proficiency of the armed forces to defend America's vital interests.

STRATEGIC APPRAISAL

Global Environment

This is now a multipolar world, but it contains only one true superpower. The use of coalitions to husband US resources and hasten diplomatic resolution of political problems is the preferred solution. But, make no mistake about it! The United States is the only country capable of unilateral military action anywhere in the world. It would be a grave mistake to relinquish sovereignty to any international organization. Others don't share our traditions of government and values. We have the ability to act unilaterally and should preserve the option to act in what we determine to be our own best interests.

That understood, the route the United States should take in pursuing all our vital interests is one of cooperation with allies, coalitions, and international organizations to achieve common goals. The United States is in a unique position of world leadership. The other two poles do not want the United States to leave Europe and Asia. Geographically removed from the other continents and possessing superpower military might, we are the only counter-balance to regional hegemonists. The United States is seen as an "honest broker" by just about every country in the world.

Domestic Environment

The chief domestic consideration in developing our national security strategy is a national consensus to reduce military spending. A probable majority would like to see our allies play a larger role in their own and regional defenses despite potential long-term negative consequences.

The danger is that United States military capabilities will be reduced below the point that they can deter aggression worldwide and support our policy interests by their mere existence.

The challenge is to gain sufficient political support for defense to retain a credible deterrent and a viable instrument of foreign policy. Success depends on the extent to which the threat is personalized. The average American could visualize a Russian communist threat and therefore support a 45-year containment policy. Even faceless third world fanatics or terrorists with nuclear weapons is easier to sell than "capabilities based" force structure. We're in danger of losing the public relations battle for defense appropriations because we don't identify the threats.

The American people and our elected representatives must be reminded that defense is not just another competing bureaucracy. While the federal government does "promote the general welfare", its first and main purpose is to "provide for..defense".

Threats to National Security

There is only one overriding threat to our national security, and that is the danger posed by nuclear weapons. All other threats pale in comparison. We must seek to reduce the CIS arsenal, to prevent proliferation to non-nuclear states, and eventually, to deploy the strategic defense initiative. There is no long-range alternative. We can reasonably expect only to delay the acquisition of rocket technology, not to forestall it forever.

The former Soviet nuclear arsenal remains the single most significant threat to U.S. national security. It demands our attention because it threatens our most basic interest - survival. There are also threats to our vital interests. But, no other threat to our immediate survival exists. No other threat has the capability to destroy the United States within thirty minutes.

The dissolution of the USSR into sovereign republics raises the specter of nuclear proliferation amidst political instability. The scenarios that have elicited the most concern include ethnic rivalries erupting into regional nuclear warfare, the sale of nuclear weapons by an individual or republic for economic gain, and the loss of control over nuclear weapons to a despondent individual communist or to a radical group. Until firm control is established, we shouldn't forget the words of Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, then Gorbachev's military advisor:

There is no dilemma of international relations, nor any inferiority in the correlation of forces, which cannot be solved or corrected with the judicious application of the appropriate yield thermonuclear device.¹

Although Akhromeyev committed suicide following the failed coup attempt in 1991, control over weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons and their non-proliferation, remains the priority issue during the political and military reorganization of the former Soviet Union.

The Strategic Rocket Forces' land-based ICBM's are now all located in four republics. The majority are in the Russian Republic, with others found in Kazakhstan, Byelarus and the Ukraine. Of the non-Russian republics, Kazakhstan has the largest number of ballistic missiles. And, although all the non-Russian republics initially expressed a desire to have nuclear weapons remain under control of the central authorities, it is significant to note that Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Byelarus now want to be involved in disarmament talks. That these republics now find it in their best interests to retain nuclear weapons is probably due to a desire for economic benefit (the weapons uranium value), and for political clout. Nonetheless, it is still a cause for concern.

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES

Strategic Defense. The idea of strategic defense won't go away. It is inherently more alluring than mutual destruction. We will eventually want to take out an insurance policy against accidental launch or a madman. The cost won't be much more than one year's agricultural subsidies. There will be a limited initial deployment, but full deployment will come. And hopefully, each phase will come in time to dissuade a potential nuclear power from making a costly investment for no appreciable gain. The project may even be undertaken in conjunction with the former Soviet Union. Russia has already expressed an interest in a joint venture and that may be a means of keeping scientists employed and minimizing the risk that they will sell their services to the highest bidders.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation. The main focus of United States foreign policy for the near future is halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. This policy requires a concerted and sustained political, diplomatic, economic, and if necessary, military effort to accomplish our strategic goals.

Forward Presence. America's greatest contribution to the world will be to provide military aid to free nations that are threatened, to deter would-be aggressors, to coordinate enforcement of economic and political sanctions when aggression does occur, and to use military power where our vital interests are threatened.

Given the distances over which America must project military power, some forward presence or basing is necessary to provide timely response wherever America's vital interests are threatened. Forward presence is a tangible reminder of American resolve to protect vital interests and a deterrent to aggressors. Beyond that, it is a stabilizing factor in regions that might otherwise engage in costly and dangerous rearmament. Power vacuums have a way of filling themselves and regional arms buildups can eventually threaten our own interests. The United States should keep at least a corps in Europe and an air presence in Korea.

Constructive Engagement/ Bilateral relations. By promoting peace with freedom, not merely "stability" or "order", we set the conditions for economic development and progress. Freedom and capitalism are virtually inseparable. You can't have one without the other; and to the extent that you limit one, you limit the other. Developing countries and partners are helped by constructive engagement. Capital flows to areas where there is little chance of outside aggression and there is a favorable free-trade climate. Countries that protect property rights, that don't threaten nationalization, and that keep taxation low, invariably prosper. Bilateral relations that provide stability, and promote freedom and capitalism are the pillars of international security.

Our policy need not include massive foreign aid on the scale of our "cold war" containment policy. Like the use of military

force, aid should be directed in support of our survival and vital interests. Even then, aid has its own risks. There is always the danger that aid, especially economic aid, will create dependency and destroy the very infrastructures that we want to promote. Far wiser than trying to buy friends is a policy of fostering democracy and free economies, locally, regionally, and globally.

Bilateral security arrangements are the foundation of any alliance structure. When our mutual security needs coincide with those of an ally, we should secure host nation support agreements to defray the costs of forward basing or equipment prepositioning. If vital interests are involved, a coordinated policy must use all the instruments of foreign policy at our disposal (including politics, diplomacy, direct economic and developmental aid, US influence in securing domestic and world bank loans, trade agreements, and military aid) to achieve reasonable support agreements. The appropriate mix of incentives and penalties is a political decision, but the key is foreign policy coordination.

International and regional cooperation. The world looks to the United States for leadership and shares our vital nuclear interests. We should be able to achieve our goals by forging alliances and coalitions that support non-proliferation and reduction of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, we ought to spare no expense to accomplish these goals before procrastination transforms our vital interests into survival interests.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

Political

Achieve American policy goals by building and maintaining coalitions that support and advance one or more of our vital non-proliferation interests.

In order to prevent the growth of regional blocks and to advance our interests, the United States must rise to its natural leadership role in the new world order. The danger of withdrawing from alliances is that current allies are potential rivals. To prevent military rivalry, we must be perceived as willing to protect our allies' vital interests. To retreat into isolationism is to encourage worldwide rearmament. We want to prevent the rise of new military powers and regional hegemonists. We want to be able to protect our worldwide interests unchallenged. The real goal of diplomacy is to achieve our goals without having to resort to military force.

Effective diplomacy, backed by political resolve, uses diplomatic pressure, and if necessary economic sanctions and military deterrent force to directly or indirectly achieve policy objectives. As an example, bilateral talks between the two Koreas recently led North Korea to agree to mutual inspections of nuclear facilities by 10 June 1992 and establishment of a joint commission

to draw up plans for banning nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula.² Even if North Korea is stalling, the direction is positive and the result of US resolve to halt proliferation.

The use of weapons of mass destruction would set a dangerous new precedent for what is acceptable in the "new world order". The world's indifference to, or lack of severe military and economic response to, the use of chemical weapons during Cold War conflict should not be repeated in "the new world order". Retaliatory and preemptive policies need to be espoused. The forum for promulgating restrictive trade regulations, economic sanctions, and military action is, preferably, the United Nations. Our goal should be international agreements backed by United Nations resolutions to use force, if necessary, to prevent proliferation and offensive use. If that cannot be achieved, we should attempt to gain the support of allies but, ultimately, reserve the right to act unilaterally where vital interests are at stake.

A major interest closely associated with our vital nuclear interests is the future of former Soviet scientists, who worked on weapons of mass destruction, nuclear programs, and ballistic missile and space projects. These men, like the German scientists that went to the US and the Soviet Union after World War II, are valuable resources. They are already being offered and are accepting jobs outside the Soviet Union. We have been too slow to react and are missing the chance to bring them to the United

States. We should spare no expense to locate all the ex-Soviet scientists with strategic weapons skills and entice them to work for us. Time is already running out. Russia's Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Germany's Genscher and United States Secretary of State Baker are talking about establishing an International Science and Technology Center near Moscow with branches in other republics for retraining Soviet nuclear scientists. The project will be financed by the United States and the European Community at a cost of \$25 million each.³ The danger is that this alone may fail to halt all emigration to wealthy societies for higher salaries.

Exercise political leadership in the world in order to extend US influence and prevent the emergence of unfriendly regional blocks.

The dangerous alternative is to abdicate our leadership role and see it filled by powers that don't support or protect our values and interests. For example, the French are opposed to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council's efforts to expand NATO's role into Eastern Europe.

Achieve unity of effort in the drug war by placing the Department of Justice's Drug Enforcement Agency clearly in charge and requiring interagency cooperation.

Diplomatic

Avoid wars by clear communication of American vital interests and intents to potential enemies.

Protecting vital interests need not require the expenditure of resources. In the past, we have become involved in expensive wars precisely because we failed to define our vital interests when doing so would have cost little or nothing. The recent Gulf War is an example. Had Saddam Hussein been assured that the United States would go to war over Kuwait, we might not have fought. A similar mistake was made with regard to Korea in the aftermath of World War II, when interests were too narrowly defined. The implications are clear regarding our diplomatic contacts with other potential aggressors. Tough talk, conveying unmistakable resolve to defend our interests and allies, will save lives and treasure.

Reduce and eliminate all nuclear weapons held by Byelarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan by concluding agreements for mutual reductions while the opportunity exists.

President Bush's proposal to cut almost half of our land-based ballistic missiles, to take all of our strategic bombers off alert, and to eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons at sea⁴ gave Gorbachev's central government the opportunity to match US proposals while removing nuclear missiles from the non-Russian

republics. Gorbachev's and now Yeltsin's willingness to make additional concessions makes it possible to achieve total Russian control of remaining tactical nuclear weapons. In President Bush's State of the Union address, he proposed a cut to 4,700 nuclear warheads (about half the July 1991 START limits) and asked Russia to give up all its MIRV'ed ICBMs. Russian President Yeltsin's counter proposal for deeper cuts came the next day. He offered to take warheads down to 2,500 but insisted that the ban on MIRVs extend to US nuclear submarines as well.⁵

The Russians appear to be willing to take warhead levels as low as we're willing to go, perhaps to the 1,000 level. At these levels other nation's nuclear arsenals gain significance. Our concern is to insure that we don't go below a level that endangers US superpower status or our security. For the immediate future, our security depends entirely on our deterrent capabilities.

Given the shared interest that both the United States and Russian leadership have in insuring non-proliferation, the future in this area looks bright. Obstacles posed by the non-Russian republics are subject to Russian control of Strategic Rocket Forces and to the influence that can be exerted by the "free world" concerning economic cooperation and assistance.

Although there is reason for optimism, the United States must move quickly to take advantage of the favorable political climate.

There exists a danger of direct outside involvement by other third world nations willing to barter directly for the remaining ICBMs. For the time being, it appears that Kazakhstan's leaders favor remaining in some form of loose confederation with Russia as opposed to an Islamic alignment. But, Ukrainian President Kravchuk's reluctance to send tactical nuclear weapons to Russia may go beyond his statement that he has no assurance they're being destroyed.⁶ United States guarantees of compliance and assistance in weapons destruction must remain available to all Commonwealth nations and show sensitivity concerning sovereignty issues.

Save resources by reducing foreign aid wherever it fails to directly support US survival and vital interests.

Over half our foreign aid goes to two countries - Israel and Egypt. With the end of the cold war, there is good reason to reassess and radically reduce military aid to both Egypt and Israel. We need to cut the flow of arms to all the potential belligerents in coordination with other suppliers. Our free weapons are unjustified. Egypt can't return to the Soviet orbit, and Israel needs to reconsider its terms for peace. Israel should bear the full economic costs of its settlement policy and its intransigence until it shows willingness to make reasonable compromises in the interest of peace.

Provide limited economic assistance to help the Russians avert starvation, prevent resurgence of dictatorship, and transition to a market economy.

Despite a recession, the United States is confronted with a problem - no an opportunity - of historic dimension. We must prevent a return of communism and the Cold War. The problems of arms control and non-proliferation are compounded by Russia's militarized economy. The research and development of both strategic and conventional systems seems to have a momentum of its own. As one conservative columnist noted:

We can reasonably expect a lag between demobilization and a productive allocation of Soviet manpower. During that lag we do not want starvation.⁷

Western assistance to the former Soviet Union in terms of economic incentives and agricultural support is tied not only to the continuation of political reform. It is inextricably linked to our own security and survival interests. We support and expedite the reform process by developing policies that provide incentives for demobilization of both strategic and conventional forces.

The United States should go beyond providing humanitarian food and medical aid to providing economic incentives, such as most favored nation status and world banking assistance to reschedule the old Soviet debt. Advise on floating the ruble, currency conversion, and selling off government enterprises to the people is

the next step. Combine this with tax advantages for US businesses and businessmen who invest and work in Russia, and we'd be doing a lot at relatively little cost. Equally important is a concerted educational program launched over commonwealth TV and radio to explain how free markets and individual businesses work.

Promote regional conventional disarmament agreements that complement the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Missile Control Technology Regime (MCTR) by unilateral or multilateral action.

Far removed from territorial disputes, the United States can promote regional stability by impartially negotiating bilateral disarmament treaties between local rivals. The United States can back those agreements with superpower guarantees for monitoring and, where vital interests are at stake, compliance. When possible, the US would defer to United Nations or regional mediators, who also are willing to backup guarantees.

Economic

Pursue a free trade policy that prevents the world from breaking down into rival protectionist camps.

The United States should promote free trade, yet be able to selectively play economic hardball. When Japan and Europe put up protectionist barriers against American agricultural products, they

hurt their own consumers most. The loss to the US is measured in terms of excess production. No retaliatory tariffs that would hurt our consumers are desired. However, if a European consortium subsidizes aircraft production to break into the American market at the expense of American manufacturers, the appropriate response is to deny the Europeans access until unfair trade practices in that industry are eliminated. Similarly, Japanese cars should not be allowed into the United States in any greater numbers than US cars are allowed into Japan. Nevertheless, retaliation should always be selective and pertain to the specific issue at hand. The United States government's policies should be aimed at ultimately reducing all trade barriers.

Revitalize our economy by unshackling productive free market forces and reducing government interference in the marketplace.

A fundamental belief in capitalism and freedom as the well-spring of human progress is essential to economic progress. Privatization of health, medical, and social security funds to reduce spiralling entitlements costs, reduction of regulation, economic free zones to revitalize inner cities, voucher systems to spur educational reform, reduction of taxes on savings and capital gains, line item veto to cut "porkbarrel spending", and a host of other free market reforms will increase productivity and reduce governmental spending and deficits. Decreasing, not increasing, governmental interference in the marketplace is the key to a

healthy economy. A free economy is the basis of any strong economic policy and of maintaining our superpower status.

National security is enhanced by keeping governmental restrictions and interference in the economy to a minimum. Only technology transfer that effects national security should be subject to regulation. Then, the Department of Defense, and not the Commerce Department or any other federal agency should have clear policy and coordination lead. The only government interference in the market that makes any sense or is constitutionally supportable is subsidy of critical defense infrastructure and defense industry. Even then, care must be taken to insure reliable allies can't provide a suitable and less costly alternative.

Military

In view of the reduction of strategic offensive weapons that will occur, the time is right to **change our posture to one of strategic defense**. As membership in the nuclear club increases, so does the threat to our survival interest. The situation in the former Soviet Union makes it easier to break out of the restrictive ABM treaty with both the support and cooperation of the Russians. The rationale for SDI is stronger than ever. The biggest hurdle facing SDI is one of domestic political opposition that can be overcome by direct appeal to the voters. The average American

would support a program to reduce our vulnerability to accidental launch or nuclear blackmail by terrorist nations if he knew we are now defenseless.

Soviet conventional forces, although internally oriented for the present, cannot be ignored. Modern weaponry and the very size of the Red Army, make it a potential long-term threat. The new defense minister, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, who as commander of the Soviet air forces refused orders to fly airborne troops to Moscow in support of the August 1991 coup, has "announced a major military purge that would replace 80 percent of the nation's top officers".⁸

Amidst organizational turmoil, Soviet forces continue the pullout from Eastern Europe. They are returning to face housing shortages and the downsizing and breakup of the military. The republics are demanding to keep their own forces and it is unclear what portion of the military will remain under central control. Russia is likely to retain control of tactical and strategic weapons. This is a positive prediction, but the possibility of non-Russian republics gaining control or another coup by a military eager to regain preeminence in Russian society cannot be discounted.

Economic cooperation and aid must be tied to dismantlement and destruction of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Nevertheless, the US must carefully weigh other issues to determine just how far to go

in support of the Russian government. While it is in the immediate US interest to support the centralized control of nuclear weapons, the future of conventional forces is quite a different issue. The United States should support the breakup of the Red Army into various republican militia.

Maintain superpower status by keeping a stronger standing military than any other individual nation.

Our primary interest is in maintaining our superpower status. It may no longer be in our best interest to encourage higher defense spending by the Japanese and Germans. We should stop urging Japan to play a larger role in its defense. United States defense spending will decline from the current 5.5 percent of GNP to a level of about 3.5 percent, which mirrors that of our European allies. That's a pre-Pearl harbor level, and only half our 1962 GNP level. Ultimately, the lobbying effort on behalf of the Department of Defense should be to tie peacetime defense spending to a percentage of the GNP. The quicker we move to do this the higher that percentage is likely to be.

Socio-psychological

Promote free market education worldwide by means of mass media campaigns designed to foster a spirit of independence and entrepreneurship.

Communicate to Asian allies the United States's commitment to their freedom and to regional stability by articulating a post-unification role for US military forces in Korea. Preempting fears of a power vacuum in the region forestalls a regional arms race.

STRATEGIC MILITARY APPRAISAL

Requirements to meet objectives

Any estimate of the military situation leads invariably to the question of how much is enough? The approach of Chairman Les Aspin's staffers on the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) is to convert potential enemies into Iraqi equivalents and then apply US Desert Storm equivalents against them. The merit of this approach is that it keeps likely "threats" as the basis of force structure. The problem is that nobody can predict all the effects of the non-quantifiable factors that make war an art rather than a science. History is replete with examples of smaller forces defeating larger forces. The impact of training, morale, surprise, maneuver, combined arms synergism, bravery and the commanders "will" are just a few of the factors that are difficult to quantify.

The HASC mathematical equivalent approach also neglects other variables such as host country infrastructure, ally contributions to the war, and changing threats. We must base force structure on our capability to project power not only within coalitions but also unilaterally. An important lesson of the recent conflicts in Panama and the Gulf is that casualties are reduced by applying overwhelming force. Just enough to win, isn't enough!

As coalition builders, we must ask what our allies and likely

coalition partners will need from the United States in future wars. The answer is that they'll need what they don't have. They need our "high tech" forces and an attack capability. The important United States contribution to coalitions is our air power and our heavy ground forces.

The Air Force proved it can be on station rapidly and, with basing rights, reduce the need for shorter range carrier-based air. Gradually, the United States can reduce the number of carrier task forces and transfer the airpower projection mission to the Air Force. Other aspects of sea power such as the surface combatant fleet can also be reduced. The threats to our sea resupply routes are significantly diminished with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Today, the US navy has more ships at sea than all the other navies of the world combined. The maritime strategy was never to protect all the oceans of the world; they're too large. Our strategy must continue to be an offensive one; to destroy the enemy fleet or bottle it up in its ports. Since the threat is reduced, the size our own navy can be reduced.

The role of heavy ground forces is to provide the ground combat power that wrests the initiative from the enemy and wins decisive victories. Potential coalition partners will have light infantry. What they'll need from us is our attack divisions - mechanized infantry and tank heavy! These forces maximize firepower, minimize casualties and bring quick victory.

Impact of new technologies?

Maintaining a technological edge over potential adversaries is critical to maintaining superpower status. The military threat to the United States is now low and we have cut force structure. The goal is to avoid "hollow" structure, to protect training, and to maintain technological superiority. Wise planners protect research and development efforts in order to secure the future. Investments in SDI, space and non-lethal technologies are examples of research efforts that offer dramatic returns.

Constraints

Economic constraints to national security spending are probably overrated. The future is brighter than at any time in the past. The possibilities of reduced Cold War expenditures, increased burden sharing by allies, free trade throughout the world, and economic prosperity are better than ever.

The economic risk is that declining defense spending will permanently drive key defense contractors out of the marketplace. The answer lies not in foreign military sales programs, which are probably better reduced in our national interest nowadays, but in direct subsidy of key industries.

Political realities are that Congress will be pushing for a peace dividend that will be used for purely domestic social welfare programs. The chance of using the money to balance the budget or to repay the national debt is slim. Nor will infrastructure upgrades be primarily national defense oriented as under President Eisenhower.

Cutting foreign aid programs, including military aid, offers the best chance for savings that could be used to reduce debt or buy security oriented infrastructure. Buying friends is bad policy. If it works, it provides questionable loyalty. Nevertheless, savings in this area are likely to be small.

If military cuts go below acceptable levels, we might also consider reinstituting the draft for pay grades E1 - E4. The intent would be to save personnel costs by decreasing enlisted pay in those ranks as the Army transitioned to a limited, two-year, conscription to meet only national defense needs. This is not a socialist, WPA-like, universal conscription for "national service" proposal. American's rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" can be constitutionally abridged only in the interest of national defense and not utopian state employment schemes. To make it fair, there would be no student deferments and only enough conscripts to fill the ranks at base force levels would be drafted.

Military constraints are that the United States cannot deal with more than two simultaneous major regional contingencies given the Chairman's base force. To reach the base force level, we have already cut valuable tactical fighter wings as well as two armored divisions and one mechanized infantry division from the armed forces. This leaves the United States with balanced ground forces capable of unilaterally defending our interests worldwide but with barely enough heavy forces for two regional contingencies. If additional manpower cuts are mandated by Congress, the United States will be forced to rely on coalitions and will have to cut those forces that provide the least to our coalition, namely surface naval forces and the light divisions other than the 82d Airborne.

Another constraint is a lack of POMCUS sets to support each contingency. In addition to the fast sealift that has been programmed, another afloat heavy division POMCUS set should be added. General Saint's suggestion that it be put on a decommissioned carrier is an excellent cost-cutting proposal.

Mobilization capabilities are also effected by force reductions. The emerging new world order prompts a reevaluation of the Total Army force. The decade began with the emergence of the United States as the world's only true superpower. Ironically, given the virtual certainty of force reductions, the United States risks losing its status as a military superpower. If reductions

through 1995 and beyond go below the base force and are mismanaged, the Army is in danger of becoming a "paper tiger" incapable of rapid global power projection.

Total Army force structure must change. The current mix of forces within the active and reserve components no longer meets national military requirements. There is no longer a major Soviet conventional threat that requires massive mobilization capability. Although the Reserve Component grew proportionately larger than the active force during the eighties, it will be a political challenge to reduce the total force along the same lines as the buildup. Attempts to reduce the Reserve Component (RC) to higher base force level are meeting opposition in Congress.

Despite thirty percent reductions in the size of the total force, the Army of tomorrow continues to be a miniature version of today's force in one important respect. The base force's active-reserve mix stays about the same. If the base force is cut, the Army will have to consider disproportionately larger reductions in the RC. With the dwindling number of active duty combat units in the total force, we risk losing our superpower status.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union makes it far less likely that the United States will fight a long war that requires anything close to full mobilization. Our experience of the last two decades indicates that the far more likely scenario is one of regional

conflict and limited engagement. When vital interests are threatened, the United States will use overwhelming military force to secure a quick victory. The American people don't want long wars and military planners can't count on support for a protracted conflict. Our goal will be to "get in and get out quickly" with a minimum expenditure of resources.

Quick victory is dependent on highly-skilled and well-trained Active Component combat forces. Reserve Component ground combat forces cannot be expected to be as well-trained as their active duty counterparts. This is a simple recognition of the fact that they do not get as much training time. The synchronization of battlefield operating systems is an art that demands a great deal of practical application and training. Skills honed in training are perishable. For the soldiers of the rapid deployment force the next war will be a "come as you are" war. It's unlikely that a future aggressor will allow us as much buildup time as Saddam did.

The Reserve Component's greatest contribution has been and will continue to be in the combat support and combat service support arena. As the active force downsizes, greater reliance should be placed on the Reserve Component's noncombat units. These units are more easily brought on board during a crisis because their missions don't require synchronization of battlefield operating systems and intensive training in combat skills. In fact, many CS and CSS units require transportation, police,

medical, computer, and other skills that are already found in the civilian sector of the economy. The same is true of many Air Force RC pilots, who train extensively in peacetime and are highly skilled in specific areas.

The contribution of Reserve Component combat units in a short duration war is limited. With the exception of artillery units, most combat units require 60 to 90 days precombat training time. Artillery units are more quickly brought on board because like the CS and CSS units they have fewer and more specific missions. Skills are more easily trained and maintained than in armor and infantry units which require synchronization of several battlefield operating systems and multiple individual combat skills.

The mix of Active and Reserve Component forces must be tailored to meet likely threats and to minimize train-up time. Few, if any, potential enemies lack sophisticated armor threats. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the availability of cheap modern weaponry on the world's arms markets should actually increase. It would be a mistake to take additional heavy units, already hard-hit by force reductions, off active duty. Heavy units require the longest train up time, but provide precisely the capability our potential allies need from the Army. Heavy forces also provide a bigger punch for the manpower investment. And finally, casualties are likely to be less when heavy units fight instead of light units.

Heavy units provide the offensive maneuver capability required to gain ground and win quick victories. They are the vital US Army contribution to ground combat in both joint and coalition operations. The Marine Corps has light units that vie for light missions and, in an era of dwindling resources, may pick up the initial forced entry mission. That is, if the United States is forced to expend lives in high-casualty forced entry at all.

Our likely coalition partners have light forces. Potential allies do not look for manpower from us; they want what our technology provides. The United States' most valuable contribution to coalitions will be modern aircraft and heavy forces.

Mobilization requirements have changed. For a variety of reasons, the RC should predominantly provide CS, CSS, artillery, and light or traditional infantry units. Beyond the reasons already mentioned, the National Guard is often called upon to provide manpower to the State governor for missions such as disaster assistance and riot control. Infantry units are better suited for these missions than armor units. In addition, the restructuring of the RC is more politically acceptable to the extent that it saves personnel spaces, and infantry units have the most spaces.

One aspect of reducing the Active Component, yet retaining the most capable ready force, may lie in transferring light infantry

and armor spaces between the Active and Reserve Components. Ultimately, however, the Reserve Component must yield combat spaces and unsupported CS and CSS spaces, because the next war we fight will not be dependent on major mobilization but rather on quick and decisive application of readily available combat power.

Force reductions overseas reflect reduced mission and CONUS-based RC units that support the theater must also be reduced as part of the same package. An army that will be cut to one-third its current strength by the mid-nineties, must preserve as much of its combat-ready active component forces as possible or risk losing superpower status.

Socio-psychological constraints are minimized when the President can coax or cajole a formal Declaration of War from Congress, or at least, as in the case of the Gulf conflict, a resolution that authorizes "all means necessary". This helps to solidify what Clausewitz called the trinity of commander, government and people.

Leaders have a responsibility to avoid falling into either the "Viet Nam syndrome" that espouses the impotence of power or the "policeman of the world" mentality that diverts our focus from vital interests. The Weinberger doctrine still provides a useful guide for a policy of world-wide constructive engagement.

MILITARY STRATEGY

CINC boundaries

Immediately merge SOUTHCOM into LANTCOM and then gradually transition to six unified commands: STRATCOM (Space, SAC, NORAD, with all ICBMs and SLBMs), PACOM (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Pacific, and Indian Oceans), LANTCOM (Latin America, Atlantic, Mediterranean), EUCOM (Europe, Russia, all Africa), CENTCOM (Middle East and SWA), and FORSCOM (ACC, SOC, TRANSCOM, and a contingency JTF). We need more than just a contingency corps, we need a contingency JTF that will be based around the contingency corps. The time to establish command relationships and habitual associations is peacetime, not the eve of combat.

Until changes to the UCP are adopted, the CJCS should determine approximate theaters of war for likely CONPLANS, and assign responsibility for those entire theaters to a single CINC. In an ideal world, theaters of war are confined to one CINC's domain. Under one CINC, simplified command and control makes it easier to develop regional contingency plans. A Korean or Persian Gulf war poses no problems regarding command and control. A Libyan or Cuban scenario doesn't fit that mold.

Like a potential Indian-Pakistani dispute, a war in Libya threatens to 'spill over' into two commands. Libya itself falls

within CINCEUR's area of responsibility. Yet, a campaign against Libya is likely to involve close cooperation with the neighboring states of Egypt and the Sudan. Egypt is a likely supporter of any US-sponsored coalition. For this reason a campaign against Libya requires adjustments to the EUCOM/CENTCOM boundary.

The current CENTCOM boundary includes the African countries of Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Drawn in the context of potential Arab-Israeli conflict, the boundary is a 'de facto' acknowledgement that past Mideast wars have always included Egyptian forces as an integral part of anti-Israeli coalitions. In this traditional scenario, Israel is the center of a potential theater of war with the surrounding Arab countries in CENTCOM's AOR. The current peace accord between the Egyptians and the Israelis, coupled with an imminent Libyan conflict, would make it possible to change the CENTCOM boundary.

If the center of a potential theater of war shifts from Israel to Libya, the CENTCOM boundary should also shift. A Libyan Theater of War (LTW) would include all countries that Libya can threaten. Egypt, directly threatened by Libyan ground forces, would be included in the new LTW. In addition to its ground forces, Libya's modern aircraft, ballistic missiles, and naval forces are capable of striking far beyond its borders. The LTW, should therefore, also encompass parts of Southern Europe (including Italy and France), the Mediterranean Sea, all of North Africa, Central

Africa, and the Red Sea. Thus defined, a LTW falls mostly within CINCEUR's domain. Short of terrorist attack and unsupportable or suicidal air and submarine operations, Libyan operational and strategic threats are easily confined to a LTW within one CINC's domain. The question of CINC ownership would be resolved in EUCOM's favor for three important reasons:

- Libyan planning is a EUCOM responsibility.
- EUCOM is already responsible for most of the LTW.
- A second conflict is more likely to occur in CENTCOM.

Similar logic would be applied in order to simplify command and control in a Cuban scenario and a CONPLAN would assign one CINC warfighting responsibility.

Coalition Command and Control

The best way to ensure unity of effort is to have unity of command. A combined command that integrates coalition forces under US command is not only desirable, but achievable in most cases. When the United States provides the most forces in theater, there is no reason to settle for anything less. When we don't provide the bulk of ground forces, we are still likely to command coalition air and naval forces, control targeting, and insist on fighting our ground forces as an integral corps.

ARMY POLICY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Maintain a balanced force that is responsive, flexible, and expandable. The base force provides these capabilities with one major structural deficiency. Today's Army still lacks much of the in-theater transport capability it requires. There is good reason to put fixed wing transport aircraft and helicopters back into all the services.

The base force allows unilateral action to cover major contingencies that we envision for the short term. The prospect of cuts to the Army base force would demand: greater reliance on coalitions; monetary savings primarily from reduction of National Guard combat units (we will win quickly without full-scale mobilization); and, personnel reductions that primarily cut light infantry divisions (low firepower per capita). See Appendix.

Plan, early in a crisis, to start moving heavy forces to the region and for a partial call up of reserves. The way to beat the US is to win before we get there. It takes more than two weeks to get the first US heavy division into Saudi Arabia, but only a week to move Iraqi, or Iranian, armor units to the border, through Kuwait, and into the kingdom. Additional POMCUS, including afloat POMCUS, helps cut availability time. But, it only cuts time from the moment the political decision is made to move the force.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Assumptions about global trends could be wrong. Dangerous assumptions are:

That we can prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. Our ability to protect America and promote America's interests worldwide is based largely on our global military power projection capabilities. If we fail to prevent proliferation, we will lose influence because our military forces and homeland will be at risk. If our enemies are stateless terrorists (e.g., the IRA, or the PLO) or states that covertly use nuclear weapons against us, the United States is extremely vulnerable and potentially defenseless.

That, despite our efforts, a new superpower (nation state or coalition) arises. The new superpower is more threatening to US interests to the extent that it is imperialistic, and advances undemocratic values and traditions.

If assumptions prove untrue, alternative courses of action and possible modifications are:

Nonproliferation. Our ability to protect the United States against accidental launches, and to deter offensive ballistic missile attacks is dependent upon our deployment of a strategic

missile defense. In order to protect military forces deployed overseas, we also urgently need a deployable follow-on to the Patriot system that is specifically designed to defeat ballistic missiles.

At present, we are still be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Today, the only recourse when attacked is massive retaliation or mutual assured destruction. To prevent terrorist attack we require dramatically improved intelligence collection or, as yet unknown, detection devices tied into an impenetrable protective system. In the meantime, there is no substitute for non-proliferation.

New superpower. The United State's commitment to freedom and democratic ideals must never waver. Containment of aggression against free states and policies beyond containment when opportunities arise is as much in our best interest in the future as it has been in the past.

REVISIONS AS NECESSARY

The revisions to policy recommendations would include effective HUMINT infiltration of states and organizations likely to violate nonproliferation edicts. The US would consider all means necessary, including unilateral actions, to prevent the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies to parties that might use them against the US. Policy escalation measures include, but are not limited to, rescission of anti-assassination statutes, and preemptive strikes. For those sworn to defend the United States, the alternatives are far worse.

APPENDIX

U.S. Army Base Force Maneuver Units

ACTIVE# /RESERVE#	KOREA	EARLY REINF	FOLLOW-ON REINF	RDF	EUROPE
Corps HQ	I	III		XVIII	V
.6 X ACR / .3		3-HOOD		2(LT)-POLK*	11-GER
.6 X IAB / .3			177-NTC	194-KNOX	
1.6 X AD / 2.6		3-(2/3)HOOD +256IB-LA		1CAV-HOOD +155AB-MS	
			42-NJ, NY, MA** 49-TX		
.3 X IMB / 1 (3 X IAB)			- - -		BBde
5 X MECH; ID	2-(2/3)TDC +81IB-WA	1-(2/3)REILLY +218IB-SC		24-STEWART	3-WZ
		4-(2/3)CARSON +116AB-MT			8-BK
/ 4			28-PA 35-KS, KY, MO, NE, CO		
& 2 X Cadre			38-IN, MI 40-CA		
1 X AAsslt				101-CAMPBELL	
1 X ABN				82-BRAGG	
2.3 X LID / 1	25-HA	+ (1/3)AK	29-VA, MD	7-LEWIS	

- Expressed in division equivalents
+ - Round up/ Round out
* - ex-199th Motorized, 9ID-LEWIS
**- Combines 26ID, 42ID, 50AR

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